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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether application of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9607, to
Greater Uniontown Vocational School
(GUVS) exceeds Congress' Commerce Clause powers
and unconstitutionally imposes retroactive liability
for pre-enactment conduct?
II. Whether CERCLA's express provision for
contribution claims under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)
restricts potentially responsible parties'
(PRPs) claims against other PRPs to
proceeding under this cause of action and prohibits
a contribution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)?
III. Whether medical expenses incurred to assess
individuals' health, as opposed to threats to the
public health or environment, fail to
constitute a removal or remedial action as
required under § 9607(a)(4)(A)?

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/13

2

1997]

MOOT COURT

875

TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................... 874
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................... 875
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................... 877
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................... 881
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW ................... 881
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ............. 882
SUMMARY ARGUMENT ............................. 883
ARGUM ENT .......................................... 885
I. THE APPLICATION OF CERCLA TO GUVS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXCEEDS CONGRESS' COMMERCE CLAUSE POWERS AND
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IMPOSES RETRO888
ACTIVE LIABILITY ......................
A. The district court's decision is review able de
885
novo ........................................
B. Application of CERCLA to the small,
backyard ditch at 123 Laurel Street
unconstitutionally exceeds the outer limits of
Congress' commerce clause powers and
encroaches on New Union's traditional police
pow ers ...................................... 888
1. The presence of photographic chemicals
in the ditch at 123 Laurel Street does
not substantially effect interstate
commerce ............................... 889
2. Aggregation analysis fails to bring the
Laurel Street activities within the reach
of Congress' Commerce Clause powers
because the activities are confined to a
small backyard ditch .................... 890
C. CERCLA unconstitutionally usurps Eleventh
Amendment state sovereignty rights when
it applied to an arm of the state where
there Has been no express waiver of state
immunity ................................... 885
D. CERCLA may not be applied retroactively
because the statute is devoid of express or
implied language, or a legislative history,

3

876

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

which evince the clear legislative intent
required by Landgraf for CERCLA to operate
retroactively ................................
1. Express language regarding retroactive
Liability is noticeably absent from
CERCLA's broad provisions .............
2. CERCLA's utilization of past tense
language does not imply clear legislative
intent to operate retroactively ..........
3. Congress' inclusion of specifically
prospective provisions in CERCLA is not
implicit of clear legislative intent to
impose liability retroactively ............
4. CERCLA can be given effect by reading
the statute to operate prospectively
only .....................................
5. CERCLA's legislative history contains no
clear evidence of congressional intent to
retroactively impose liability ............
E. Assessing CERCLA liability to GUVS' pre1980 Conduct is retroactive because it creates
new legal consequences for acts completed
seven years prior to CERCLA's enactment..
CONCLUSION ......................................

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/13

891
892
893

893
894
895

896
907

4

1997]

MOOT COURT

877

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th
Cir.1994) .............................................. IV.A
Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 909 F. Supp. 1154
(N.D . Ind. 1995) ....................................... IV .A
Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. Pa.
1990) .................................................. V .A
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir.
1989) .................................................. IV .A
Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F.
Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ............................ IV.A.1
Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn.
1988) .................................................. V.A
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University,
935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) ..................... III.A
Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid
Co., 898 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Mich. 1995) .............. IV.C
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal,
814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1992) ................... IV.A.1
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 107 (1980) ............................. III.B.1
Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930 (8th
Cir. 1995) ............................................. IV .A
Covalt v. Carey CanadaInc., 860 F.2d 1434 (7th Cir.
1988) ................................................. III.A .1
Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir.
1992) .................................................. V .A
Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Burlington N. R.R., 951 F.2d
246 (9th Cir. 1991) ...........................
IV.A
Durfey v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 59 F.3d 121
(9th Cir. 1995) ........................................ V .A
Edelman v. Jordan,415 U.S. 651 (1974) .............. II.A
G.J. Leasing Co., Inc. V. Union Elec. Co., 854 F. Supp.
539 (S.D. Ill. 1994), affd, 54 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1995) . IV.B
Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S.(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) .......... II.A
Hadley v. North Ark. Comm. Technical College, 76 F.3d
1437 (8th Cir. 1996) ................................... II.A

5

878

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) .................. II.A
Hess v. PortAuth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394
(1994) ................................................. II.A
In re Hanford Nuclear Litig., 780 F. Supp. 1551 (E.D.
W ash. 1991) ........................................... V .A
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .................. III.B.4
Kashani v. Purdue Univ. 813 F.2d 843, 846 (7th Cir.
1987) .................................... .............
II.A
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14
F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1994) ............................... IV.C
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1960
(1994) .................................................
000
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1499
(1994) ................................................. IV .A
Mackey v. Stanton, 586 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1978) ..... II.A
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th
Cir. 1986) ............................................ IV .A.1
Matter of Bell Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889 (5th
C ir. 1993) ............................................. IV .B
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) ............... II.A
Mount Healthy Bd. Of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977) ................................................. II.A
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1,(1937) .......................... III.A
Nevada v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev.
1985) ................................................. III.B .1
Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio
1983) ................................................. III.B .1
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.
Ct. 1114 (1996) ........................................ II.A
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) .............
I
Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir.
1994) .................................................. V .A
Seibert v. University of Okla. Health Sciences Ctr., 867
F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1989) .............................. II.A
Seminole Tribe of Fla. V. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114
(1996) ................................................. II.A

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/13

6

1997]

MOOT COURT

879

Society for the Propagationof the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22
F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814)(No. 13,156) ........... III.C.1
Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511 (1885) ............
III.C.1
Touche Ross v. Redington, 422 U.S. 560 (1979) ....... III.B.1
Town of Munster v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Inc., 27
F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1994) ..............................
IV.A
Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 919 F. Supp.
662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) .................................. IV.A.1
United States v. $814,254.76, 51 F.3d 207 (9th Cir.
1995) .................................................
III.B .3
United States v. Colorado & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530
(10th Cir. 1995) ..............................
IV.A
United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328 (11 cir. 1996) ... III.A
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) .........
III
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir.
1988) .................................................. IV .C
United States v. NortheasternPharmaceutical& Chemical Co.,Inc. 810 F.2d 726 (D. Nev. 1996) ............. III.B.1
United States v. Olin Corp. 927 F. Supp
1502(S.D.Ala.1996) ..................................
III.C. 1
United States v. Pappadopoulos,64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir.
1996) ..................................................
III.A
United States v. Pickney 85 F.3d 4 (2nd Cir. 1996) .... III.A
United States v. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D.Colo.
1985) .................................................
III.B .1
United States v. South CarolinaRecycling & Disposal
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986) ..................
III.B.1
United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-FerrisIndus.
33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994) .............................
IV.A
Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Cal.
1987) .................................................. V .A
Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn.
1990), vacated in part on other grounds, 793 F. Supp.
898 (1992) ............................................. V .A
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).............. III.A.2
Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) ............................................. V .A
Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. ACF Indusl, Inc., 909 F.
Supp. 1290 (E.D. Mo. 1995) ...........................
IV.B

7

880

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

U.S. CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, REGULATIONS
U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3 .............................
III
U.S. Const. art I, § 7, cl. 2 ............................. III.B
U .S.Const.amendXI ...................................
II
42 U .S.C.§6924(u) .................................... III.B.1
42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq ................... Proceeding Below
42 U .S.C. § 9601 (23) ..................................
V
42 U .S.C. § 9601 (24) ..................................
V
42 U .S.C. § 9601 (25) ..................................
V
42 U .S.C. § 9603 ..................................... III.B.5
42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1) .......... SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
42 U .S.C. § 9604 (i) .................................... V.C
42 U.S.C. § 9604 (i)(6)(B) .............................. V.C
42 U .S.C. § 9604 (i)(8) ................................. V.C
42 U .S.C. § 9607 ......................................
IV
42 U .S.C. § 9607 (a) ...................................
IV
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(A) ............................. IV.A
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(B) ............................. IV .A
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (b)(1)-(4).24 .......................... IV.A
42 U .S.C. § 9613 ......................................
IV
42 U .S.C. § 9652 (a) .................................. III.B3
400 C.F.R. § 300.400(f) ................................ V.C
MISCELLANEOUS
H.R. 7020 § 3072, 96th Cong. (1980) .............
III.B.1
H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess., (1986). IV.A.1
H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) .......
V
125 Cong. Rec. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) ..... III.B.5
126 Cong. Rec. at H11,772 (daily ed. Dec 3, 1980) .... III.B.5
The American Heritage Dictionary, 1001, (2nd ed.
1782) .................................................. IV .B
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Commerce Committee, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Hazardous Waste Disposal (Comm. Print 1979) ...... III.A.1
Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed. 1996) .... III.B.2

The Federalist No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) ...........
The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison) ...............
The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) ...............

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/13

II.A
II.A
II.A

8

1997]

MOOT COURT

881

The FederalistNo. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ............................ II.A
Stephen F. Baicker-McKee and James M. Singer,
Narrowing the Roads of Private Cost Recovery: Recent
Developments Limiting the Recovery of Private Response Costs Under CERCLA §107, 25 Envtl. L. Rep.
10593 (1995) .......................................... IV.A
William A.Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the
Eleventh Amendment, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983) ...

II.A

George Clemon Freeman, Jr. A Public Policy Essay:
Superfund Retroacitivity Revisited, 50 Bus. Law. 663
(1995) ................................................ III.B .4
Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1
(1982) ....................................
III.B.4
Alfred R. Light, CERCLA Law and Procedure Compendium, (BNA, Washington D.C., 1992) ................. III.B.5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Appellant, Greater Uniontown Vocational School (GUVS)
has appealed the district court decision regarding its liability
to the State of New Union Health Services Agency
(SNUSHA) and While-U-Wait Photo Service (WUWPS) under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
WUWPS also appealed the decision of the district court on
the issue of CERCLA liability.
WUWPS initiated action against GUVS pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) asserting that GUVS is liable to
WUWPS for the costs of water testing, site investigation and
soil removal totalling $30,300. Simultaneously, SNUSHA initiated an action against GUVS and WUWPS for recovery of
medical monitoring costs under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) at
an approximate cost of $43,750. The appeals were consolidated following the district court's determination of the crossmotions for summary judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Post-high school educational opportunities in Union
County, New Union were virtually non-existent until the
1963 New Union legislature statutorily appropriated one million dollars to establish GUVS as an educational outreach to
this area. (R. at 2). The New Union legislature directed that
GUVS' initial Board of Directors be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the New Union Senate.
(R. at 2). For nearly a decade, GUVS operated at a facility
located at 123 Laurel Street in Uniontown, New Union where
it enrolled a total of thirty students from the Union County
area in its photography program. (R. at 2-3).
During its operation at 123 Laurel Street, GUVS procured all of its photography equipment and chemicals from
New Union Industrial Supply Corp. (NUISC), located in New
Union. (R. at 2-3). The chemicals and equipment were formulated and manufactured in New Union by NUISC. (R. at
3). Adhering to the standard practice within the photography
community and all state and environmental laws, GUVS disposed its waste photographic solutions in the backyard ditch
at 123 Laurel Street. (R. at 3).
GUVS sold 123 Laurel Street and its photographic equipment to a commercial enterprise, Start-Up Photography Studios (SUPS). (R. at 3). SUPS also purchased its
photochemicals from NUISC and disposed of the photochemical waste in the same ditch which GUVS had utilized until
SUPS went bankrupt in 1979. (R. at 3).
In 1980, WUWPS, a film processing service, purchased
the property in bankruptcy proceedings. (R. at 3). Even
though WUWPS sole proprietor was fully aware of SUPS' and
GUVS' disposal practices and their environmental risks,
WUWPS did not obtain any warranties against environmental or property liability. (R. at 4). While the parties stipulate
that the photochemical waste disposed at 123 Laurel Street
was the type disposed of by both GUVS and SUPS, there are
no records indicating the portion attributable to each, nor is
there an accounting for the property's vacancy from 1979-80.
(R. at 4).
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In 1993, 123 Laurel Street's next-door neighbors, the Marinas, noticed a "camera-type" odor emanating from their
well water. (R. at 4). WUWPS unilaterally had the Marinas'
water analyzed and detected an above-average presence of
photographic chemicals. (R. at 4). In 1994, WUWPS expended $30,000 for an investigation and soil removal at the
property which conclusively determined that all health and
environmental threats were eliminated. (R. at 4). Nevertheless, upon the Marinas' initial request for a health assessment in 1994, SNUSHA implemented a six-year program to
monitor the health of the Marina family's seven members
quarterly, at an annual rate of $1000 per person. (R. at 5).
Although all activities at the site have been executed consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), no federal or
state environmental protection agencies have been involved
in the activities at 123 Laurel Street. (R. at 5).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court did not reach the issue of GUVS' Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the court allowed GUVS to
be brought before a court of federal jurisdiction. In dismissing GUVS' claim, the district court contradictorily recognized that the Supreme Court had expressed concern over the
extension of Commerce Clause jurisdiction to reach State
arms. If the district court had examined GUVS' state connections, paying particular attention to GUVS' source of funding,
the court would have properly concluded that GUVS is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in a federal
jurisdiction.
Additionally, the court incorrectly ruled that the site at
123 Laurel Street was within the realm of Congress' Commerce Clause powers. The "mass" of land which the court
held subject to CERCLA was nothing more than a backyard
ditch. "[D]espite the comparatively small impact" of 123 Laurel Street's ditch to interstate commerce, the court extended
the reach of Congress' Commerce Clause powers to encompass this site in violation of the "substantial effects"
requirement.
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The district court should not have held GUVS liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 for its pre-1980 conduct, because at
the time of the conduct's completion, no liability could have
attached to GUVS under then existing New Union and environmental laws. In rendering GUVS liable, the district court
erroneously determined that, as applied to GUVS, CERCLA
liability was not operating retroactively. Additionally, the
court failed to identify any clear legislative intent regarding
retroactive operation of CERCLA. Had the court struggled to
divine the intent of the 96th Congress in enacting CERCLA,
the court would have discovered no express or implied language, nor any legislative history, evincing the requisite intent for statutory retroactive effect.
The court erroneously held that WUWPS could proceed
against GUVS, its fellow PRP, in a strict liability suit under
42 U.S.C. § 9607. However, Congress expressly codified 42
U.S.C. § 9613 to provide a mechanism for the allotment of
contribution costs, including orphan's shares, among PRPs.
Additionally, the court failed to investigate the necessity of
the costs incurred by WUWPS during its unilateral cleanup
of 123 Laurel Street. Thorough analyzation would have
proven that the initial recognition of the site's containment
rendered any subsequent costs at the site unnecessary under
§ 9607(a)(4)(B), and therefore, the costs were irrecoverable.
Despite the court's finding, assessment of medical monitoring costs against GUVS was violative of § 9607(a)(4)'s goal
of providing for "removal" and "remedial" actions. The class
of activities which fulfill a "removal" or "remedial" purpose
under this provision address threats to public health and the
environment. Congress intentionally excluded personal medical monitoring costs from § 9607's provisions, and instead,
created the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry
at 42 U.S.C. § 9604(1). Therefore, GUVS is not liable to
SNUSHA or WUWPS for any costs stemming from 123 Laurel Street.
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ARGUMENT
I. The district court's decision is reviewable de novo.
The lower court's decision imposing CERCLA liability on
GUVS was based on case law and statutory interpretation.
(R. at 5-7). This categorizes the court's determination as a
question of law. See Pierce v.Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558
(1988). As such, the standard of appellate review is de novo.
Id.
II.

CERCLA unconstitutionally usurps Eleventh
Amendment state sovereignty rights when it is
applied to an arm of the state where there has
been no express waiver of state immunity.
The United States' Constitution created a federalist system of government to prevent tyranny over the people. See
The FederalistNo. 9 (Alexander Hamilton). The fragmentation of power and its resulting frustrations were intended to
prevent the accumulation and overreach of power by either of
the governments, or any of the branches, by positioning ambition against ambition. See The Federalist No. 51 (James
Madison). Specific powers were delegated to the federal government to ensure the continuation of unity among the several states, while all unenumerated powers were left to the
states to govern their internal interests best. See The Federalist No. 45 (James Madison). "The genius and character of
the [federal] government seems to be, that its action is to be
applied to all the external concerns of the nation and to those
internal concerns which affect the states generally; but not to
those which are completely within a particular state ....
.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
The Eleventh Amendment states, "[t]he Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens or another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign state." U.S. Const. amend. XI. This
amendment embodies two principles. "First[,] each state is a
sovereign entity in our federal system; and second[,] '[i]t is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to
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the suit of an individual without its consent.'" Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)(quoting The FederalistNo. 81, at
487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); See
also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
Seminole re-established the principle that a private
party cannot sue a state, or an arm of the state, in a federal
court without an express waiver of the state's sovereign immunity. In doing so, the Seminole court directly overruled
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which had
rendered states' amenable to suit under CERCLA based on
an attenuated interpretation of Congress' Commerce Clause
powers. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. V. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996). Following Seminole, Congress can not supply
private parties with a federal cause of action against any
state or any state arm, under CERCLA, in abrogation of a
state's sovereign immunity. Although GUVS conceded that it
does not qualify as a state agency, it did not abandon its entitlement to Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of the
New Union educational system. (R. at 6). If New Union is
erroneously hailed into federal court, its Eleventh Amendment immunity will be rendered a nullity since the immunity
to which it is entitled is not an immunity from liability, but a
recognition of sovereignty which shields the states from federal jurisdiction. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526
(1985). In determining whether a statutorily created entity is
an arm of the state, the court should first examine "the nature of the entity created by state law." Hadley v. North Ark.
Community Technical College, 76 F.3d 1437,1439 (8th Cir.
1996)(citing Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 280 (1977)); See also Seibert v. University of Okla. Health
Sciences Ctr., 867 F.2d 591, 594-95 (10th Cir. 1989). GUVS
was created by the New Union state legislature for the express purpose of augmenting the inadequate educational
services provided by New Union's state universities and community colleges to vocational students in the Union County
vicinity. (R. at 4). As such, GUVS must be deemed an extension of New Union's educational arm in Union County.
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The Supreme Court has not fashioned a comprehensive
test for the circuits to employ in discerning which state-related entities receive Eleventh Amendment immunity. However, the Court has stated that in analyzing an entity's nexus
with the state, "rendering [state] control [over the entity] dispositive does not hone in on the impetus for the Eleventh
Amendment: the prevention of federal court judgments that
must be paid out of a State's treasury." Hess v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394, 404-06 (1994); See
Edelman v. Jordan,415 U.S. 651 (1974); William A. Fletcher,
A Historical Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1129 (1983).
Meanwhile, courts have utilized various factors to determine when an entity's finances are independent of the state
treasury. One factor is an entity's power of taxation. "The
absence of the power to tax is a strong indication that an entity is more like an arm of the state than like a county or city,
because that enablement gives an entity an important kind of
independence." Kashani v. Purdue Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 846
(7th. Cir 1987). Similarly, the capability of an entity to issue
bonds is determinative. See Mackey v. Stanton, 586 F.2d
1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1978). An entity's ability to tax or issue
bonds also has proven dispositive in local school district and
state university cases which have disallowed Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Although GUVS has never requested additional state funding, GUVS is powerless to tax or
issue bonds, and therefore, it is ultimately dependent on New
Union for funding. (R. at 2). Therefore, GUVS should be
treated like an arm of New Union and extended Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Otherwise, any judgment against
GUVS would be borne by the New Union treasury and would
effectually circumscribe New Union's Eleventh Amendment
protection from suit in a federal jurisdiction.
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III. Application of CERCLA to GUVS' conduct exceeds
Congress' Commerce Clause powers and
unconstitutionally imposes retroactive
liability.
Our founding fathers empowered Congress "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8,
cl. 3 (emphasis added). If this enumeration is to have any
effect, it must "presuppose[ ] something not enumerated...
the exclusively internal commerce of a State." Gibbons, 22
U.S. at 195. For over 50 years, the Supreme Court found
Congress' commerce clause powers boundless. This era
ended when the Court demonstrated that Congress' commerce clause powers are "subject to outer limits." United
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995).
A. Application of CERCLA to the small ditch at 123
Laurel Street unconstitutionally exceeds the limits of
Congress' commerce clause powers and encroaches
on New Union's police powers.
Writing for the Lopez majority, Justice Rehnquist
warned:
the scope of the interstate commerce power "must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace
them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what
is local and create a completely centralized government."
Id., 114 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (quoting NationalLabor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937)). In the wake of Lopez, many courts have heeded the
Court's warning and have held unconstitutional statutes that
were enacted under the premise of Congress' commerce
clause powers for their failure to satisfy the Lopez test. See,
e.g., United States v. Danelli, 73 F.3d 328 (11th Cir. 1996)(per
curiam)(federal arson statute); United States v. Pinckney, 85
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F.3d 4 (2nd Cir. 1996)(federal Anti Car Theft Act); United
States v. Pappadopoulos,64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995)(federal
arson statute); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State
Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996)(Violence Against
Women Act). Similarly, Lopez' refusal to "pile inference upon
inference" in determining the bounds of the interstate commerce clause is dispositive and precludes this court from finding the ditch at 123 Laurel Street to be within the realm of
Congress' powers. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634. To hold otherwise unconstitutionally "convert[s] congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the
sort retained by the States." Id.
Lopez recognized that Congress can regulate, "the use of
the channels of interstate commerce. .. the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce ...[and] activities having a substan-

tial relationship to interstate commerce." Id., 115 S. Ct. at
1629 (emphasis added). Like Lopez, the wholly intrastate activities on Laurel Street fall within the third category which
requires that the activities must be "economic" and "substantially effect" interstate commerce. Id., 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
1. The presence of photographic chemicals in the ditch
at 123 Laurel Street does not substantially effect
interstate commerce.
As applied to 123 Laurel Street, CERCLA attempts to
reach non-migrating substances buried in the ground. The
presence of these substances is neither economic, nor interstate. Although some composition of the substance may have
once traveled across state lines, the attachment of federal
regulations to their altered form now dissipated in New
Union's sub-stratum would have absurd ramifications. See
Covalt v. Carey CanadaInc., 860 F.2d 1434, 1436-37 (7th Cir.
1988)(stating that CERCLA has the potential to be applied to
"everything pertaining to planet Earth."). Congressional
skepticism recognized that CERCLA may not be able to reach
properties like 123 Laurel Street where "the effects of inadequately contained wastes are reasonably localized . .. [and]

their impact frequently does not cross state lines." Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Coin-
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merce Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Hazardous Waste
Disposal 73, 80 (Comm. Print 1979) (separate views of Rep.
Dannemeyer).
GUVS never directly engaged in interstate commerce
when purchasing its photo chemicals and equipment. (R. at
5). Although NUISC utilized raw materials purchased from
the national market when it manufactured the chemicals and
equipment used by GUVS' photography program (R. at 5),
manufacture and pre-manufacture were never intended to
fall under Congress' interstate commerce clause powers. See
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643-44 (Thomas, J., concurring)(stating
that raw materials "may have been in commerce at one time,
but manufacturing takes place at a discrete site."). Furthermore, GUVS procured photographic supplies and equipment
for three students per year for less than ten years during its
occupation of 123 Laurel Street. Thus, attributing the presence of photographic chemicals in the ditch at 123 Laurel
Street to interstate commerce is characteristic of the attenuation which Lopez disapproved.
2. Aggregation analysis fails to bring the Laurel
Street activities within the reach of Congress'
Commerce Clause powers because the
activities are confined to a small backyard
ditch.
In 1942, the Court announced the most far-reaching decision regarding Congress' powers to regulate interstate commerce. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). During
that era when the United States struggled to emerge from
the quagmire of the Great Depression and simultaneously
was concerned with global warfare wartime efforts, the stabilization of wheat prices was imperative to the nation's economic survival. Thus, the Court determined that despite the
de minimis character of Roscoe Filburn's wheat overgrowth,
Filburn was subject to congressional authority. Id. The
Court reasoned that the aggregate effect of other wheat farmers similarly situated could adversely impact the stabilization of one of the nation's largest market commodities, and
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therefore, Congress had the power to regulate even de
minimis intrastate actors. Id., 317 U.S. at 128.
Roscoe Filburn's twelve-acre overgrowth of wheat is not
analogous to the backyard ditch at 123 Laurel Street. The
target of Congress' Commerce Clause powers on Laurel
Street is not a market commodity which must be regulated to
ensure the stabilization of the nation's economy. Even if similarly situated backyard ditches were aggregated, they would
not substantially effect interstate commerce because the regulated actions are de minimis and are not economic.
Additionally, GUVS was an educational non-profit entity
who by law had to procure as many of its supplies as possible
from in-state vendors. (R. at 2). While the Lopez court conceded that Congress' Commerce Clause powers could encompass "numerous commercial activities that substantially
affect interstate Commerce and also affect the educational
process," the court recognized that those powers are not infinite. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. The Court acknowledged
that, "[i]n a sense any conduct in this interdependent world of
ours has an ultimate commercial origin or consequence, but
we have not yet said the commerce power may reach so far."
Id., 115 S. Ct. at 1640 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Since
GUVS' procured photographic chemicals manufactured in
New Union to educate a total of thirty students, its impact on
interstate commerce was minimal, and its actions should not
be subjected to Congress' Commerce Clause powers.
B.

CERCLA may not be applied retroactively because the
statute is devoid of express or implied language, or a
legislative history, which evince the clear
legislative intent required by Landgraf for
CERCLA to operate retroactively.

The Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), strengthened the presumption against retroactivity by disentangling the requirement of
"clear legislative intent" necessary for retroactive statutory
application. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1500. While acknowledging that retroactive operation of statutes is sometimes be-
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nign, the Court re-emphasized its continuing disdain for
statutes which unfairly disrupt settled expectations. Id., 114
S. Ct. at 1497-98. The eight-justice majority warned Congress that courts may no longer fill intentional gaps regarding the temporal reach of statutes. Id., 114 S. Ct. at 1500.
With this warning, the era of judicial policy-making interpreting CERCLA to operate retroactively must come to an
end.
1. Express language regarding retroactive liability is
noticeably absent from CERCLA's broad
provisions.
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the language of the statute itself. See Touche Ross v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 568 (1979). "Absent a clearly expressed legislative
intention to the contrary, [a statute] must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). Nowhere in
CERCLA's expansive provisions can "retroactive" be found.
42 U.S.C. § 9601, et. seq. Although Congress is not required
to use "retroactive" where retroactivity is being created, the
96th Congress knew how to craft plain language to convey
retroactivity. See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. § 3072 (1980); 42
U.S.C. § 6924(u) (requiring "corrective action ...

regardless

of the time at which waste was placed in such unit.")
Despite Congress' ability to clearly express retroactivity,
the only provision which Congress empowered to trigger
CERCLA's temporal span is silent on retroactive operation.
42 U.S.C. § 9652(a). Specifically, § 9652(a) states: "Unless
otherwise provided, all provisions of this chapter shall be effective on December 11, 1980." As discussed in Landgraf,analyzation of an effective date provision is unavailing to the
search for legislative intent regarding retroactivity. Landgraf,114 S.Ct. at 1493. Although not all of the courts which
favor appellees agree with this interpretation of § 9652(a), all
agree that no express language of retroactivity appears in
CERCLA's vast provisions. See e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical& Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726,
732; Nevada v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 698 (D. Nev.
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1996); United States v. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1069 (D.
Colo. 1985); Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1309 (N.D.
Ohio 1983).
2.

CERCLA's utilization of past tense language does
not imply clear legislative intent to operate
retroactively.

The framing of CERCLA's provisions in past tense language is insignificant to the retroactivity issue. Landgraf
never contemplated the past tense language in the 1991 Civil
Rights Act to be indicative of retroactivity. See Landgraf,114
S. Ct. at 1483. Courts which ultimately find the requisite intent for retroactive application of CERCLA have also dismissed the statute's past tense language. See, e.g. Nevada,
925 F. Supp. at 699-700; Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1309-10.
Were the past tense language employed in section 107 to be
considered, corresponding present tense language would negate all possible verb tense implications. See Shell Oil, 605 F.
Supp. at 1073.
3.

Congress' inclusion of specifically prospective
provisions in CERCLA is not implicit of clear
legislative intent to impose liability
retroactively.

The Court, in Landgraf,examined an effective date provision which parallels § 9652(a). There, the petitioner's argued, as do appellees here, that the statute operated
retroactively because Congress included two provisions which
"otherwise provided" for prospective operation in the act.
Landgraf,114 S. Ct. at 1493. While the LandgrafCourt recognized the limited validity of this negative implication argument, the Court stated that,
given the high stakes of the retroactivity question, the
broad coverage of the statute, and the prominent and specific retroactivity provisions in [the introductory] bill, it
would be surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve
th[e retroactivity] question through negative inferences
drawn from [ ] provisions of quite limited effect .... Had
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Congress wished [the effective date provision] to have such
a determinative meaning, it surely would have used language comparable to the predecessor [ provisions...
Id., 114 S. Ct. at 1493-94.
Analogously, CERCLA's effective date provision had a
predecessor which would have directed the statute to operate
retroactively. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., § 3072(1980). As introduced, H.R. 7020 applied "to releases of hazardous waste
without regard to whether or not such releases occurred
before, or occur after, the date of the enactment." Id. However, Congress contemplated this provision, eliminated it,
and provided no comparable language in the final enactment.
See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601. Arguably, Congress' deletion
of the retroactive provision from CERCLA's predecessor statute strongly suggests legislative intent to impose liability
prospectively only. See United States v. $814, 254.76, 51 F.3d
207, 212 (9th Cir. 1995). Additionally, the use of negative implication analysis is diametrically opposed to the ascertainment of clear legislative intent. See 2B Sutherland Statutory
Construction § 55.02 (5th ed. 1996). Thus, if any value is to
be garnered through negative implication in CERCLA's context, the import conveyed by Congress' intentional deletion of
the retrospective language must be, at a minimum, that there
was no clear congressional intent behind retroactive liability.
4.

CERCLA can be effectuated through a prospective
reading.

Without a retroactive application of CERCLA, parties
would still be legally responsible if their pre-enactment conduct was actionable under a then existing state cause of action or if their conduct spanned the pre-enactment and postenactment eras. See George Clemon Freeman, Jr., A Public
Policy Essay:
Superfund Retroactivity Revisited, 50 Bus. Law. 663, 681
(1995). Courts which have found CERCLA's provisions to implicitly provide for retroactivity have ignored these possible
interpretations of Congress' intent in their attempts to vindicate the perceived remedial object of CERCLA more effi-
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ciently. See Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1075-76. See also
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal Inc.,
653 F. Supp. 984, 996-98 (D.S.C. 1986). However, the Court
cautioned that efficiency does not warrant a presumption of
retroactivity since "[sitatutes are seldom crafted to pursue a
single goal, and compromises necessary to their enactment
may require adopting [less efficient] means ... ." Landgraf,
114 S. Ct. at 1507-08.
5.

CERCLA's legislative history contains no clear
evidence of congressional intent to retroactively
impose liability.

Although CERCLA's predecessor bill shared the designation "Public Law No. 96-510" and had a considerable legislative history, the legislative history behind the bill actually
enacted at 42 U.S.C. § 9603 is sparse. See Frank P. Grad, A
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of
1980, 8 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 (1982). This brevity is attributable to Congress' chaotic atmosphere in the final days of its
outgoing session. Id.
Retroactivity was debated only on the Senate floor,
before CERCLA was placed before the House on a "take it or
leave it basis." Id. There, individual members voiced their
partisan opinions regarding the effect of CERCLA's liability
provisions; however, these statements are unavailing of Congress' collective intent in enacting CERCLA. See Alfred R.
Light, CERCLA Law and Procedure Compendium (BNA,
Washington, D.C., 1992) at 1-1. Indeed, "[t]hat CERCLA
passed at all is a minor wonder. Only the frailest, momentto-moment coalition enabled it to be brought to the Senate
floor...." 126 Cong. Rec. at H11,772 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980).
As the Court has heeded, "[i]t is... highly probable [ I that,
because it was unable to resolve the retroactivity issue with
the clarity of," H.R. 7020, § 3072, "Congress viewed the matter as an open issue to be resolved by the courts. Our precedents on retroactivity left doubts about what default rule
would apply in the absence of congressional guidance...."
Landgraf,114 S.Ct. at 1494. Congress agreed to disagree on
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CERCLA's liability issues and compromised by leaving ambiguities for judicial resolution under evolving common-law
principles. See 126 Cong. Rec. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24,
1980)(statement of Sen. Randolph). Thus, Congress unconstitutionally delegated the difficult policy decision of retroactivity to the courts. Congress' unwillingness to determine
CERCLA's retroactivity prohibits the courts from imposing
CERCLA retroactively even if the congressional majority covertly agreed that retroactive operation would emerge. See
Landgraf,114 S. Ct. at 1496 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 946-951 (1983)).
C.

Assessing CERCLA liability to GUVS' pre-1980 conduct
is retroactive because it creates new legal
consequences for acts completed seven years prior
to CERCLA's enactment.

Since the late eighteenth century, American jurisprudence has recognized that a retroactive statute "takes away
or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability. . . ." Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519 (1885)
(quoting Society for the Propagationof the Gospel v. Wheeler,
22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814)(No. 13, 156)). In the instant case, SNUSHA and WUWPS seek to hold GUVS liable
for its conduct which was legal and unactionable under any
New Union state claim when it was completed in 1973. (R. at
3, 5). Application of CERCLA's liability provisions to GUVS
would create new liabilities for conduct which predated CERCLA's enactment, and therefore, would require a retrospective application of CERCLA. Cf., Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at
1499.
The district court incorrectly pinpointed CERCLA's liability attachment at the commencement of the cleanup expenditures at 123 Laurel Street in 1993. See United States v.
Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1516. The district court's misplaced focus lends to a prospective interpretation of the statute; however, the true focus must be on the conduct to which
the statute is seeking to attach liability. Landgraf,114 S. Ct.
at 1499. Landgrafemphasized the long settled principle that
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the creation of "new legal consequences to events completed
before [the statute's] enactment" is the determinative inquiry
into a statute's retroactive nature. Id. Landgrafadded that
without a clear statement from Congress, the Court had
never read a statute to apply to pre-enactment conduct where
that interpretation would "substantially increas[e] [the] monetary liability of a private party." Id., 114 S. Ct. at 1506-07.
Here, respondents seek to attach retroactive liability to
GUVS. Application of CERCLA is not rendered retroactive
merely because GUVS' conduct at 123 Laurel Street ceased
eight years before CERCLA's enactment, but because this application seeks to impose new liabilities on GUVS for its conduct which occurred wholly before the statute's enactment.
Despite appellant's assertion to the contrary and the erroneous conclusions of the district court, the imposition of new liabilities for actions completed before CERCLA's enactment
date requires a retrospective application of the statute. Since
clear legislative intent regarding retroactivity is not apparent, CERCLA liability may not be assessed against GUVS.
IV.

A.

GUVS may not be held jointly and severally liable
by a fellow PRP under § 9607 since Congress
expressly provided § 9613 to provide for
equitable apportionment between PRPs.

WUWPS must proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) for
contribution costs from its fellow PRP, GUVS.

CERCLA § 9607(a) imposes strict liability on all past and
present owners and operators of hazardous waste sites. See
§ 9607(a). Under CERCLA both GUVS and WUWPS are potentially responsible parties (PRPs), and as such they are
limited to the four enumerated defenses. § 9607(b)(1)-(4).
While WUWPS does not seek to avail itself of any of the
aforementioned defenses, WUWPS attempts to be absolved of
its liability through a non-existent fifth defense: The first
PRP to the courthouse door is absolved of all liability. See
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal, 814 F.
Supp. 1269, 1277 (E.D. Va. 1992). WUWPS attempts to
evade liability and hold GUVS strictly liable for the costs
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WUWPS incurred following its unilateral cleanup 123 Laurel
Street. However, as the owner of 123 Laurel Street, WUWPS
was the only private party capable of initiating actions at
that location. Since GUVS relinquished its control of 123
Laurel Street more than twenty-three years ago, GUVS was
legally incapable of commencing any action at 123 Laurel
Street in 1993.
The federal appellate courts which have considered the
availability of a remedy between PRPs have determined that
the only appropriate means of redress is a suit for contribution under § 9613(f). See Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C.
Corp., 53 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Colorado
& E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995); United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-FerrisIndus., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir.
1994); Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th
Cir. 1994); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th
Cir. 1989); See also, Dant & Russell, Inc. v. Burlington N.
R.R., 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991). Following principles of
equity, current case law demonstrates that "the trend is towards holding [] PRPs [ ] limited to [§ 9613(f)] claims when
they bring private causes of action under CERCLA." Steven
F. Baicker-McKee and James M. Singer, Narrowing the
Roads of Private Cost Recovery: Recent Developments Limiting the Recovery of Private Response Costs Under CERCLA
§ 107, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 10593, 10595-96, n.30 (1995). Ironically, Baicker-McKee's article is the sole authority upon
which the district court relied in allowing WUWPS to bring a
suit against GUVS under § 9607. (R. at 7).
In suits between PRPs, "[§ 9607] provides the framework
for a plaintiff to establish a defendant's liability" while
"[§ 9613(f)] creates a mechanism for apportioning that liability among the responsible parties." Akzo Coatings, 909 F.
Supp. 1154, 1160 (N.D. Ind. 1995)(citing Town of Munster v.
Sherwin-Williams Co. Inc., 27 F.3d 1268, 1270 (7th Cir.
1994)); See also Control Data, 53 F.3d at 934.
While the Supreme Court in Key Tronic Corp. v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 1960, 1966 (U.S. 1994), intimated that
§ 9613 does not preempt "overlapping remedy in § [9607]",
this dicta must be read cautiously since the issue was not
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before the court for resolution. See United Technologies, 33
F.3d at 103 n. 12. Additionally, Key Tronic involved an action
initiated by a settling PRP. Key Tronic, 114 S. Ct. at 1963.
1. Congress enacted § 9613(f) as the sole remedy
between PRPs.
Originally, CERCLA provided no express means for apportionment of liability among PRPs - any PRP could have
been "singled out as the defendant in a cost-recovery action
without any apparent means of fairly apportioning CERCLA
costs [levied] against it to other PRPs." United States v. Colorado & E. R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995). To address this inequity, many courts recognized a "correlative
right of contribution" between PRPs. Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C.
Music Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986). Congress
"confirm[ed]" this right of contribution by enacting § 9613 in
the 1986 SARA amendments. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I) at
79 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861.
Some lower courts have held that § 9607(a)(4)(B)'s inclusion of "any other person" allows PRPs to sue under § 9607 or
§ 9613. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 814 F. Supp. at
1277; Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis Indus., Inc., 891 F.
Supp. 221, 225 (E.D. Pa. 1995). One court also found dispositive CERCLA's lack of expressly limiting PRPs to the remedy
provided under § 9613(f). See Bethlehem, 891 F. Supp. at
225. However, other courts have determined that "any other
party" effectually requires innocence. "Congress would not
have taken the trouble to codify the right of contribution in
[§ 9613(f)], if a responsible or potentially responsible party all
along had the right to seek to impose joint and several liability under [§ 9607]." Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc.,
919 F. Supp. 662, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)(citing, United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 100-01).
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Following the canons of statutory construction,
PRPs must proceed under § 9613(f) for
contribution suits.

Ascribing the plain language meaning to § 9613(f)'s use
of "contribution" complements CERCLA's scheme. See
United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 99. Contribution is defined
as, "a claim 'by and between jointly and severally liable parties for an appropriate division of the payment one of them
has been compelled to make.'" Colorado& E. R.R., 50 F.3d at
1536 (citing Akzo Coatings, 30 F.3d at 764). "[W]ere PRPS
...

allowed to recover expenditures incurred in cleanup and

remediation from other PRPs under [§ 9607]'s strict liability
scheme, § 9613(f)] would be rendered meaningless." Id., 50
F.3d at 1536.
In an attempt to effectuate every provision in a statute,
the United Technologies "refuse[d] to follow a course that
[would] ineluctably produce[ ]judicial nullification of an entire SARA subsection." United Technologies, 33 F.3d at 101.
Any actions under § 9607, with a six-year statute of limitations, would be an attempt to avoid the three-year time limitation of § 9613. See Id, 33 F.3d 96; Colorado & E. R.R., 50
F.3d at 1530. Allowing a PRP to proceed under the greater
statute of limitations provided under § 9607 also would circumscribe CERCLA's promotion of early settlement. United
Technologies, 33 F.3d at 103.
Finally, the broad sweeping nature of CERCLA has not
been compromised by the enactment of § 9613. CERCLA still
casts a large "strict liability" net among all PRPs subject to a
few defenses which are extremely difficult to assert. Section
9613 simply provides the means by which PRPs may equitably allocate this liability.
B.

GUVS is not liable for the cleanup costs incurred at
Laurel Street because they were not "necessary."

CERCLA liability does not attach to response costs unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that these costs were both
"necessary" and "consistent" with the National Contingency
Plan (NCP). § 9607(a)(4)(B). See Control Data, 53 F.3d at
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934 (citing § 9607); Amoco Oil v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664,
672 (5th Cir. 1989). While all parties have stipulated that
the costs incurred during the cleanup of 123 Laurel Street
were consistent with NCP, the costs were not "necessary."
Response costs are only deemed necessary if "an actual
and real public health threat exists prior to initiating a response action." G.J. Leasing Co. Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 854
F. Supp. 539, 562 (S.D. Ill. 1994)(citing Matter of Bell Petroleum Services, Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 904-906 (5th Cir. 1993)); See
also Amoco, 889 F.2d at 669-70. Although public health is not
defined at § 9601 et. seq., the term is commonly understood
as referring to "the art and science of protecting and improving community health." The American Heritage Dictionary,
1001 (2nd ed. 1982).
The response costs incurred at 123 Laurel Street were
unnecessary because there was "no evidence of an immediate
threat to public health or the environment ...

[n]or ...

any

persuasive evidence of the possibility or likelihood that [the
contaminants]... would migrate. ... " Yellow FreightSys.,
Inc. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 1290, 1299-1300 (E.D.
Mo. 1995). The "release" at 123 Laurel Street was incapable
of migrating beyond the Marina property's border and affecting any other property's water source. (R. at 4). Therefore,
there was no threat to the community's health, and accordingly, no public health concerns. Additionally, there was no
Environmental Protection Agency directive or order, and no
settlement or injunctive relief commanding such measures.
(R. at 5). Thus, the costs incurred were unnecessary and
irrecoverable.
C.

Should the court determine that the cleanup costs were
necessary, GUVS is only responsible for its equitable
share of the total liability, including the orphan
share.

Section 9613(f) provides that, "[i]n resolving contribution
claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable
parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate." § 9613(f). In a CERCLA action for contri-
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bution, the PRP would only be liable to recover an amount
from any recalcitrant PRP that is equal to its equitable contribution. See Akzo Coatings,30 F.3d at 764; United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988).
Most courts have relied on the "Gore factors" in allocating response costs among liable parties under CERCLA. See
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d
321, 326 (7th Cir. 1994); ControlData, 53 F.3d at 935. These
equitable factors distinguish PRPs' contributing conduct, considering: the types, amount and toxicity of the waste involved; the type of activity engaged in during the conduct;
and the parties' cooperation in remediating the site. See
Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp, 14 F.3d at 326, n.4; Control
Data, 53 F.3d at 935. Other considerations are the "circumstances and conditions involved in the property's conveyance." Amoco, 889 F.2d at 673.
Although there are no records allocating the amount of
waste disposed of by GUVS and SUPS (R. at 4), the Gore factors can be considered in determining the parties' level of liability. Considering the amount and degree of the conduct
carried out by GUVS and SUPS at 123 Laurel Street, the
harm attributable to GUVS' education of three students annually is distinguishable from the harm attributable to
SUPS' commercial photo-processing service. Furthermore,
WUWPS' owner was fully aware of the photo chemical dumping at 123 Laurel Street and SUPS' insolvency when she
purchased the property in bankruptcy proceedings. (R. at 4).
"Equity and fairness dictate[ ] that the shares that would
have been attributed to parties that are now insolvent should
be apportioned among all of the solvent PRPs," including
plaintiff. Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., 898 F. Supp. 506, 509 (W.D. Mich. 1995). Therefore,
SUPS' orphan share must be equitably apportioned to all solvent parties, including WUWPS. See Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 814 F. Supp. at 1277-78.
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V. CERCLA does not provide a cause of action for
recovery of medical monitoring costs pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
In analyzing the recoverability of medical monitoring
costs pursuant to § 9607(a)(4)(A), the beginning point must
be the plain language of the statute. See Touche Ross, 442
U.S. at 568. Section 9607(a)(4)(A) provides recovery for all
"removal" or "remedial actions." Removal is defined in pertinent part as:
such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and
evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of
such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or
to the environment
§ 9601(23). "Remedial actions" are defined as, "those actions
consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions." § 9601(24). The section provides
liability for "all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by . .

.

a State . .

.

not inconsistent with the [NCPI."

§ 9607(a)(4)(A).Although prior case law has not examined
medical monitoring recovery under § 9607(a)(4)(A), courts
have analyzed the issue under § 9607(a)(4)(B) which analogously allows recovery for "any other necessary costs of response . .

.

consistent with the [NCP]."

See § 9601(25).

Therefore, actions permitted under § 9607(a)(4)(A) for "removal" or "remedial action" correspond with those addressed
under § 9607(a)(4)(B) for "costs of response." While the parties agree that SNUSHA's actions were not inconsistent with
the NCP, at issue is whether those actions constitute "removal" or "remedial action."
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A. Analyzing the class of conduct which constitutes
removal and remedial actions demonstrates that
medical monitoring is not a similar action
recoverable under § 9607(a).
The first federal appellate court to address the issue of
whether or not medical monitoring may be recovered as a "response" cost or "remedial action" relied on ejusdem generis
and answered the question in the negative. See Daigle v.
Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir. 1992)(relying on legislative history and canons statutory construction); See also
Durfey v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir.
1995); Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1015-17
(9th Cir. 1994).
The class of actions constituting removal include, "security fencing or other measures to limit access ...

alternative

water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of
threatened individuals." § 9601(23). Section 9601(24) specifically enumerates "storage, confinement, perimeter protection . . ., [and] onsite treatment . . ." as remedial actions.

§ 9601(24). While acknowledging that the list of specific examples of "removal" in § 9601(23) was nonexclusive, the Daigle court found that "under traditional statutory canons of
construction" it was only reasonable "to conclude that any
other recoverable costs must be at least of a similar type."
Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535; See also, Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc.,
750 F. Supp. 1233, 1247 n.17 (M.D. Pa. 1990). The heart of
CERCLA's definitions of removal and remedy are "directed at
containing and cleaning up hazardous substances releases."
Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535. "As these definitions indicate, removal actions are designed to effect an interim solution to a
contamination problem, while remedial actions are designed
to effect a permanent solution." Id., 972 F.2d at 1533-34.
CERCLA's plain language does not "address monitoring of individuals for personal health reasons." Wehner v. Syntex
Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651, 653 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
The only courts allowing the recovery of medical monitoring costs have been district courts. See Brewer v. Ravan, 680
F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); See also, In re HanfordNu-
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clear Reservation Litig., 780 F. Supp. 1551 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
The Brewer court found it dispositive that the words "monitoring" and "health and welfare" were encompassed in the
definitions section § 9601(24). Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at 1178.
However, as Daigle illustrates, Brewer's reliance was misplaced. See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535 (stating "Both definitions are directed at containing and cleaning up hazardous
substance releases.").
Daigle concluded that "removal actions" are actions
designed to effect an interim solution to a contamination
problem - such as security fencing, alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1533-34. The enumerated
examples in § 9601(23) are all designed to prevent or mitigate
damage to public health by preventing contact between
spreading contaminants and the public. Monitoring longterm health has nothing to do with preventing such contact.
Price, 39 F.3d at 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, Brewer's holding is only applicable in cases
where monitoring public health is necessary to remediate a
hazardous waste release. See e.g., Woodman v. United States,
764 F. Supp. 1467, 1470 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (disallowing medical monitoring costs because they did not relate to public
health, but rather to the health of each family member). Furthermore, the Brewer court did not find that all medical monitoring costs are CERCLA response costs. In Brewer, the
plaintiffs sought recovery of medical testing and screening
costs which were necessary to measure the extent of local
hazardous waste contamination and the subsequent threat
the health of the local population. Brewer, 680 F. Supp. at
1179; See also, Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887,
904 n.18 (D. Minn. 1990)(holding that medical monitoring
might be recoverable where "medical tests would be necessary to determine how far a particular contaminant had
spread.").
Therefore, even under the purview of Brewer and its
progeny, medical monitoring costs must be limited to those
necessary for the "public health." In this case, the extent of
the hazardous waste contamination was confined. (R. at 4).
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The engineering report, accepted as accurate by all parties,
stated that, "with the contaminated soil removed from the
ditch, there is now no longer a threat to anyone's health or
the environment." (R. at 4). In fact, the contamination would
have only reached the Marina's private drinking well - not a
community water source. (R. at 4). Clearly, SNUSHA is not
trying to recover costs aimed at monitoring the public health
or environment. To the contrary, SNUSHA is seeking costs
arising from the periodic monitoring of an individual family's
health. Moreover, the seven affected individuals initiated
their own medical examinations. (R. at 4). This is not a public health issue.
B.

The legislative history behind 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(a)
clearly indicates congress' intent not to include
medical monitoring costs.

The stated purpose of CERCLA was "to initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism
to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." H.R.
REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125. A thorough and comprehensive review of the legislative history reveals that Congress
did not authorize the recovery of medical monitoring costs.
To the contrary, Congress intentionally eliminated provisions
which would have created private causes of action for personal injury, medical, and economic loss from early House
and Senate bills. These provisions were not revived in the
final Senate amendment which became CERCLA. See 125
Cong. Rec. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)(statement of
Sen. Randolph)("We have deleted the Federal cause of action
for medical expenses or income loss."). The Daigle court also
found Senator Randolph's statement to be a "reliable indicator of Congressional intent to exclude medical expenses from
recovery," inasmuch as he was a co-sponsor of the compromise bill. Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1536 (internal quotations omitted); Wehner, 681 F. Supp. At 653.
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Congress specifically intended to include medical
monitoring costs in the Agency for Toxic Substance
and Disease Registry provision of CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9604(i).

Congress explicitly established the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry (ATSDR) to undertake medical
testing and collection of information in certain circumstances.
§ 9604(i); See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1535-37. ATSDR was created by the 1980 CERCLA legislation, and the 1986 SARA
Amendments empowered ATSDR with an elaborate scheme
of functions relating to the assessment of health effects of actual and threatened hazardous substances releases. Daigle,
972 F.2d at 1536. ATSDR was expressly given the ability to
conduct formal health assessments at sites if provided with
information from individuals or physicians regarding human
contact with released hazardous materials. §9604(i)(6)(B);
400 C.F.R. § 300.400(f). In the case of a serious health risk,
ATSDR was additionally given the authority to establish a
long-term "health surveillance program" to include "periodic
medical testing." 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(8). As, the Ambrogi
court notes, "Congress created an expanded role for the
[ATSDR] to provide medical examinations.. .." to remedy the
perceived inadequacies of the 1980 enactment. Ambrogi, 750
F. Supp. at 1249. "Clearly, Congress was not ignorant of the
potential need for medical testing arising out of a release of
toxic substances. It chose to delete the medical provisions
from section 9607, and to address testing concerns via section
9604(i)." Werlein, 746 F. Supp. at 904.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Greater Uniontown Vocational
School (GUVS) respectfully requests this court to: 1) find
that the district court erroneously precluded the extension of
New Union State's Eleventh Amendment immunity to GUVS;
2) reverse the district court's finding that Congress' Commerce Clause powers extend CERCLA liability to GUVS; 3)
reverse the district court's findings that, as applied to GUVS,
CERCLA does not unconstitutionally impose retroactive lia-
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bility; 4) reverse the district court's conclusion that GUVS is
subject to a strict liability suit under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) by
WUWPS; and 5) reverse the district court's finding that CERCLA allows SNUSHA to recover medical monitoring costs
from GUVS pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Appellant
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